
























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study 
of Labor 
Labour Market Institutions and Unemployment: 
Does Finance Matter?




Labour Market Institutions and 




















P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 

















We explore whether finance influences the impact of labour market institutions on 
unemployment. Using a data set of 18 OECD countries over 1980-2004, we estimate a panel 
VectorAutoRegressive model. We check whether causalities from labour market variables to 
unemployment are affected by financial factors. In Belgium, Italy, Australia, Japan and Spain, 
accounting for financial indicators mitigates the benefits of labour market flexibilization or 
makes it harmful to employment. In Austria, Canada, Finland and Portugal, it reduces its 
detrimental impact or makes it beneficial. In Ireland and Netherlands, both effects prevail, 
depending on the labour market indicator used. 
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The dramatic increase in unemployment rates due to the recent nancial crisis in a large number
of countries provides an additional clue that nance signicantly aects employment performance.
According to the new-Keynesian view, imperfections within the nancial system (such as ad-
justment costs and information asymmetries) play a crucial role in rms' labour demand and
in employment uctuations. Greenwald & Stiglitz (1993) and Arnold (2002) show that nan-
cial constraints induced by information asymmetries make rms' labour demand dependent on
their balance-sheet position. As a consequence, employment uctuates according to the nancial
pressures that rms face. These theoretical arguments are conrmed by rm-level econometric
investigations. Sharpe (1994) documents that the sensitivity of American rms' labour demand
to sales increases with their leverage ratio. Using a set of British rms, Nickell & Wadhwani
(1991) show that employment decreases with rms' leverage ratio and increases with their market
capitalization while Nickell & Nicolitsas (1999) establish that employment falls with the ratio of
interest payment to cash-ow. Moreover, Caggese & Cunat (2008) obtain that nancial constraints
inuence rms' employment policy and the mix between permanent and temporary employment.
Finally, Acemoglu (2001) examines how nancial factors aect employment through their impact
on rms' creation. Financial constraint harms employment because it hinders the emergence of
new innovating rms, which create jobs. The author observes that, since the 60's, the employment
rates of rms dependent on external nance has been higher in Europe than in the United States,
arguing that this is due to the stronger regulation of European nancial systems1.
Financial factors are not the only drivers of unemployment. A large literature pays particular
attention to labour market institutions as crucial determinants of employment performance. In
Nickell (1997), Siebert (1997) and Layard & Nickell (1999), strong labour market regulation,
unemployment protection, wage taxation and union action are considered as factors of rigidity
and unemployment2. Moreover, interactions among labour market arrangements are also shown
to aect employment performance (Nickell, Nunziata, Ochel & Quintini (2002), Nickell, Nunziata
& Ochel (2005))3.
These contributions on the determinants of unemployment have been recently enriched by fruit-
ful developments which point out the existence of complex interactions between nancial factors
and labour market institutions. Beyond their eect on the design of the political system (Pagano
& Volpin (2005)), the nature of the legal framework (Ergrungor (2004), Botero et al. (2005)) or
the distribution of nancial wealth (Perroti & Von Thadden (2006)), interactions between nance
and labour market arrangements also inuence job creation.
First, labour market devices are not neutral with respect to the way nance aects unemploy-
ment. While theoretical models by Rendon (2001) and Belke & Fehn (2002) conclude that weaker
1For similar arguments concerning the impact of venture capital on rms' creation and employment, see Fechs
& Fuchs (2003) and Belke, Fehn & Foster (2004).
2For a survey, see Arpaia & Mourre (2005).
3In a similar vein, an abundant literature has been devoted to the interactions between labour market institutions
and product market regulation (Blanchard & Giavazzi (2003), Amable & Gatti (2004), Nicoletti & Scarpetta (2005),
Amable & Gatti (2006), Grith, Harrison & Macartney (2006), Berger & Danninger (2007), Fiori, Nicoletti,
Scarpetta & Schiantarelli (2007), Kugler & Pica (2008) and Amable, Demmou & Gatti (2011)).
2labour market institutions mitigate the favourable eect of nancial development on employment,
Koskela & Stenbacka (2004) obtain that they amplify the positive eect of intensied banking
competition. Using a data set of 18 OECD countries between 1980 and 2004, Gatti, Rault &
Vaubourg (2011) propose an empirical investigation of these issues. They establish that increased
market capitalization as well as decreased banking concentration reduce unemployment if the level
of labour market regulation, union density and coordination in wage bargaining is low. Moreover,
increasing intermediated credit and banking concentration is benecial for employment when the
degree of labour market regulation, union density and wage coordination is high.
Symmetrically, nancial factors also inuence the relationship between labour market arrange-
ments and unemployment. On the one hand, Rendon (2001) obtains that nancial development
reduces the positive eect of labour market exibilization on employment performance. On the
other hand, Wasmer & Weil (2004) nd that ercer competition in the credit market may exacer-
bate it. Conducting dynamic panel estimations, Gatti & al. (2011) do not provide strong evidence
supporting any of these theoretical predictions. But conclusions may be dierent in a country-
specic framework. For instance, nance may mitigate the eect of labour market exibilization
in some countries while it may exacerbate it in some others.
The goal of this paper is precisely to examine this issue by testing for Granger-causalities from
labour market variables to unemployment in order to check whether these causalities are aected
by nancial variables for each country of the sample. We estimate a panel Vector AutoRegressive
(VAR) model using the same data as Gatti & al. (2011). We implement the panel-data approach
of K onya (2006), based on Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) system and Wald tests with
country specic bootstrap critical values. In the specic framework we use, we allow for cross-
country correlation, without the need of pretesting for unit roots and cointegration (as in Phillips
(1995)).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical and empirical background
of our study. Section 3 is devoted to the econometric investigation. Section 4 proposes some
extensions to our analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical and empirical background
In this section, we present the theoretical and empirical background of our investigation.
2.1 Theoretical literature
Rendon (2001) provides a theoretical model where labour market exibilization, through a reduc-
tion in adjustment costs (i.e., ring and hiring costs) fosters job creation. Financial development
also promotes employment. As their access to external nance is improved, rms can more easily
nance labour adjustment costs. Their hiring policy thus becomes less dependent on internal
resources and they adjust their employment level more rapidly. Consequently, when the level
of nancial development is high, removing labour market adjustment costs has weak eect on
employment since ring or hiring costs can be nanced by security issuance. On the contrary,
if nancial development is low, labour market exibilization becomes particularly eective since
3rms' ability to nance labour market adjustement costs is reduced.
Wasmer & Weil (2004) concentrate on the eect of credit market concentration. Lower com-
petition in labour and/or credit markets reduces markets' liquidity and agents' matching costs.
Firms and workers match less easily on the labour market, as well as rms and banks on the
credit market, yielding negative eects on employment. The model exhibits general-equilibrium
interactions between credit and labour markets. More frictions in the credit market reduces the
number of lenders such that it becomes more dicult for rms to match with a funder. This
discourages the entry of rms, which in turn makes it less likely for workers to get a job. The
detrimental eect of increased liquidity in the labour market is thus exacerbated by imperfections
in the credit market.
The theoretical literature thus shows that nance is not neutral as regards the way labour
market institutions aect employment performance. The goal of this paper is to check the empirical
relevance of this view.
2.2 Empirical literature
Using annual rm-level data for 10 European countries over the period 1994-2000, Calcagnini,
Giombini & Saltari (2009) investigate how interactions between nancial and labour market fac-
tors aect investment. Using the system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to estimate a
dynamic panel-data model, in which the investment ratio is explained by the level of rm liquid-
ity, the intensity of labour market regulation as well as a term that captures interactions between
both variables. They nd that the liquidity ratio has a positive impact on rms' investment while
the degree of labour market regulation has a negative impact. More interestingly, the sign of
the coecient for the interaction between capital and labour market variables appears signi-
cant and negative. The authors then conclude that interactions among both nancial and labour
market imperfections contribute to lower investment. However, the paper does not provide any
clear evidence as regards the way interactions between nancial and labour market variables aect
employment performance.
This issue of unemployment is explicitly explored by Gatti & al. (2011). On a sample of 18
OECD countries over the period 1980-2004, they also resort to GMM techniques. The level of un-
employment is explained by nancial variables (stock market capitalization, intermediated credit
and banking concentration), labour market factors (labour market regulation, union density and
coordination in wage bargaining) as well as a term that captures interactions between both nancial
and labour market variables. They show that the impact of nancial variables on unemployment
strongly depends on the labour market context. More especially, increased market capitalization
and reduced banking concentration curb unemployment if the level of labour market regulation,
union density and coordination in wage bargaining is low. Moreover, raising intermediated credit
and banking concentration promotes employment when the degree of labour market regulation,
union density and wage coordination is high. However, the eect of labour variables turns out to
be weakly aected by nancial factors. Then, Gatti & al. (2011) test for Granger-causalities from
nancial factors to unemployment for each country of their data set. Their panel VAR approach
conrms their GMM results. No causality appears from nancial variables to unemployment when
the labour market context in not taken into account. However, when labour market devices are
4accounted for, the paper documents signicant causalities from nancial variables to unemploy-
ment in many countries of the data set. Moreover, the signs of causalities are mainly consistent
with GMM results. But the authors do not investigate Granger-causalities from labour market
institutions to unemployment nor whether they could be aected by nancial indicators.
The goal of our paper is to ll this gap. Panel VAR estimations should allow us to rene
the ndings obtained by Gatti & al. (2011) using GMM techniques: while nancial factors do
not inuence the relationship between labour market institutions and unemployment from an
aggregate point of view, they may have an impact when adopting a country-specic approach.
3 Econometric investigation
This section is devoted to the econometric analysis. The rst subsection focuses on data and
the econometric methodology while the second subsection presents our results.
3.1 Data and econometric methodology
Following Gatti & al. (2011), we use a panel that includes annual data for 18 OECD countries
(Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States) which covers
the period 1980-2004.
To conduct our panel VAR analysis, we consider three categories of variables. First, U is the
standardized rate of unemployment taken from the OECD.
Second, LAB is a set of ve variables accounting for labour market institutions. LMR is
the measure of employment protection legislation built by Amable, Demmou & Gatti (2011)4. It
is a time-series variable between 0 (for the lowest level of employment protection) to 3 (for the
highest level of protection). COORD evaluates the degree of coordination in wage bargaining.
Taken from Nickell & al. (2005), this variable ranges from 0 to 3 with higher scores corresponding
to higher coordination. UNION is the degree of union density, calculated by the OECD as the
proportion of union members among workers. In Section 4, we extent our analysis to two additional
LAB variables, both provided by the OECD. The rst one, denoted WEDGE, stands for the tax
wedge while the second one, REPLACE, measures the replacement rate for unemployment benet
respectively. The higher these ve indicators, the tighter labour market institutions.
Finally, FIN denotes a set of three nancial indicators, all taken from the Demirc u c-Kunt &
Levine (2001) data set. The two rst variables account for nancial development. CAPI is a ratio
of stock market capitalization to GDP. CREDIT is a ratio of intermediated credit, measured
by the claims to the private sector by nancial intermediaries (deposit money banks, insurance
companies, private pensions, pooled investment schemes and development banks) to GDP. The
4This time-series indicator is based on EPL (Employment Protection Legislation) scores obtained from Nickell
& al. (2005) as well as on measures of structural reforms provided by the FRDB Database (the number of reforms
passed each year in each country, whether they are directed towards more exibility as well as whether they apply
to all, or a large majority of professional categories, contract typologies etc).
5third indicator, CONC, measures the degree of concentration of the banking sector. It is dened
as the ratio of the three largest banks' asset to total banking sector assets. Note that this ratio is
only available over the period 1990-2004.
The list of these variables is reported in Table A.1 in Appendix. Table A.2, also included in
Appendix, provides summary statistics for each of them.
Our approach consists in testing for Granger-causalities from labour market variables (LAB)
to unemployment (U). Our goal is to explore whether (and how) these causalities are aected by
nancial variables (FIN) for each country of our data set. To do this, we use the recent bootstrap
panel causality test developed by K onya (2006), which is based on the following bivariate (here
composed of unemployment, U and one labour market indicator, LAB) or trivariate (here U, LAB
and one nancial indicator FIN) nite-order vector autoregressive models, with the variables taken
in level:
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, where the index i (i = 1;:::;N) is the country, the index t (t = 1;:::;T) the period, j the lag,
and p1i, p2i, p3i the longest lags in the system. The error terms "1;i;t, and "2;i;t are supposed to be
white-noise and may be correlated with each other for a given country.
Systems (1) and (2) are estimated by the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) proce-
dure (since possible links may exist among individual regressions via contemporaneous correlation
within equations (1a) and (1b) of system (1); and within equations (2a) and (2b) of system (2)).
Then Wald tests for Granger-causality are performed with country specic bootstrap critical val-
ues generated by simulations.
With respect to system (1) for instance, in country i there exists a one-way Granger-causality
running from LAB to U if in the rst equation, not all 1;i are zero but in the second, all 2;i are
zero; there is a one-way Granger-causality from U to LAB if in the rst equation, all are 1;i zero
but in the second, not all 2;i are zero; there is a two-way Granger-causality between U to LAB
if neither all 1;i nor all 2;i are zero; and there is no Granger-causality between U to LAB if all
1;i and 2;i are zero5.
5As stressed by K onya (2006), this denition implies causality for one period ahead.
6This procedure has several advantages. Firstly, it does not assume that the panel is homoge-
neous, so that it allows to test for Granger-causality on each individual panel member separately.
However, since contemporaneous correlation is allowed across countries, it makes it possible to
exploit the extra information provided by the panel data setting and therefore country-specic
bootstrap critical values are generated. Secondly, this panel approach generalises the method-
ology developed by Phillips (1995)6 that tests for non-causality in level VARs. In a time-series
context, it does not require pretesting for unit roots and cointegration, though it still requires
the specication of the lag structure (which is determined here using the Akaike Information Cri-
terion (AIC) and the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC)). This is an important feature since
unit-root and cointegration tests generally suer from low power, and dierent tests often lead to
contradictory outcomes. Thirdly, this panel Granger-causality approach allows to detect for how
many and for which members of the panel there exists a one-way Granger-causality, a two-way
Granger-causality or no Granger-causality.
Finally, our econometric approach can be summarised as follows. For each country of our
sample we rst estimate three bivariate panel VAR models, each including one labour market
variable (labour market regulation, union density and wage coordination successively) and unem-
ployment. We then estimate nine trivariate panel VAR models, each including one labour market
variable, one nancial variable (market capitalization, intermediated credit or concentration) and
unemployment. Comparing bivariate and trivariate estimations will allow us to check whether in-
troducing a nancial variable in the VAR model aects the causality (or the absence of causality)
from labour market factors to unemployment.
3.2 Results
Results of panel VAR estimates are reported in Tables 1, 2 and 3. Table 1 summarizes Granger-
causality tests from labour market regulation (LMREG) to unemployment while Tables 2 and 3
relate to Granger-causalities from union density (UNION) to unemployment and from wage co-
ordination (COORD) to unemployment respectively. In each table, Part A reports the results for
the bivariate VAR model estimations while Part B, Part C and Part D present the results for the
trivariate VAR model estimations, including stock market capitalization (CAPI), intermediated
credit (CREDIT) and banking concentration (CONC) respectively.
6As it is now well known, testing for non-causality is addressed in a time-series setting, in particular by Phillips
(1995) in the context of a level VAR estimated using the Fully Modied (FM) estimator, as well as by Toda &
Yamamoto (1995) who suggest augmenting the VAR by the maximal order of integration for the process being
examined. The former method provides some very interesting results as far as asymptotic inference is concerned.
The most important one is that statistical inference in this framework can be conducted by means of standard
asymptotics. In this case, no unit root limit theory is required. Normal and mixed normal limit theory is applied
to the stationary and non-stationary components of the VAR respectively. This implies that optimal inference in
level VARs and Wald test for non-causality can be obtained without prior knowledge of the number of unit roots
or the order of cointegration rank in the system, and without the use of reduced rank Johansen-type regressions
(which are subject to pretesting bias, since tests for cointegration ranks are extremely sensitive to the values of
the nuisance parameters). The approach by Toda & Yamamoto (1995) also results in a standard Wald statistic for
non-causality restrictions, although it requires some pretesting for determining the lag length of the VAR.
7Tables 1 to 3 reveal interesting facts. To start with, it is worth noting that, except in a very
few countries, there exists no robust causality from labour market variables to unemployment
in bivariate models (Part A of Tables 1 to 3). This is in line with Amable & al. (2011) and
Gatti & al. (2011). This is also consistent with Baker, Glyn, Howell & Schmitt (2004), who
moderate the view that labour market institutions, notably labour protection and union density,
has played a crucial role as regards labour market performance in OECD countries since the 80ies.
However, when the estimated model contains one nancial variable (Parts B, C and D of Tables
1 to 3), causalities between labour market factors and unemployment arise in many countries.
This lends some support to the view that nance crucially inuences the impact of labour market
arrangements on unemployment. Moreover, comparing Tables 1, 2 and 3 suggests that nancial
factors particularly matter as regards the impact of wage coordination on employment.
Let us now analyze the coecients reported in Tables 1 to 3 in detail. In a rst group of coun-
tries, accounting for nancial variables mitigates the positive impact of increased labour market
exibility on employment7. In Ireland, weaker labour market regulation decreases unemployment
(Part A of Table 1) but this relationship vanishes when the level of stock market capitalization or
the degree of banking concentration is introduced in the estimation (Parts B and D of Table 1).
In Belgium, weaker wage coordination also reduces unemployment (Part A of Table 3) but this
benecial eect does no arise anymore when stock market capitalization and intermediated credit
are accounted for (Parts B and C of Table 3).
In some countries, accounting for nancial factors even makes labour market exibilization
harmful to unemployment. This observation is in line with a few papers which, in opposition to
most of the literature on labour market institutions, point out the benets of labour protection
(Bentolila & Bertola (1990), Fella (2004)). Part C of Table 1 shows that in Ireland, a decline in
labour market protection turns out to bring negative eects on employment due to the introduc-
tion of intermediated credit in the model. In Italy, introducing the level of market capitalization
in the estimation also makes labour market exibilization harmful for employment (Part B of
Table 1) while it has no eect in the bivariate model (Part A of Table 1). The same phenomenon
is observed in Netherlands as regards the eect of weaker union density (Part A and Part B of
Table 2). Moreover, Parts A, B and C of Table 3 report that in Australia, Japan and Spain, less
coordinated wage bargaining damages employment performance when stock market capitalisation
or intermediated credit are introduced in the model. This harmful impact of weaker coordination
is documented in the empirical literature (Nickell (1997), Nickell & al. (2002)). It is also in line
with the theoretical argument that coordination works as a wage moderation device (Calmsfors &
Drill (1988)): when the labour market becomes less coordinated, this moderation eect is weak-
ened and employment is reduced. Finally, in Finland, when banking concentration is introduced
in the estimation, weaker labour market regulation increases unemployment (Part D of Table 1)
while it has no signicant impact in the bivariate model (Part A of Table 1).
In a second set of countries, the introduction of nancial variables results in a positive eect
7Note that our estimates do not allow to check whether the mitigation eect results from a rise or from a decline
in nancial development or banking concentration.
8of labour market exibilisation on employment. In Canada and Portugal, decreased union density
has no eect on unemployment (Part A of Table 2) but it turns out to be favourable to employment
when one accounts for the level of stock market capitalization or intermediated credit (Parts B and
C of Table 2). Similarly, in Netherlands, reduced wage coordination does not aect employment
(Part A of Table 3) but when taking intermediated credit into account, it contributes to curb
unemployment (Part C of Table 3). Finally, Parts D of Table 2 and Table 3 report that in
Sweden, decreased union density and reduced wage coordination respectively are made benecial to
employment when taking into account the level of concentration in the banking sector8. Combined
with the result obtained above for Finland, this suggests that in Scandinavian countries, the
structure of the banking market plays a particularly important role as regards interactions with
labour market institutions9.
Moreover, there exist some countries in which the introduction of nancial variables does not
amplify the positive eect of labour market exibilisation on employment but, at least, contributes
to curb its harmful eects. This is the case for Austria, in which reduced union density and wage
coordination have no eect when market capitalization and intermediated credit are introduced in
the estimation (Parts B and C of Tables 2 and 3 respectively) while they have a negative impact on
employment in the bivariate model (Part A of Tables 2 and 3 respectively). Similarly, in Ireland,
the detrimental eect of reduced wage coordination on employment (Part A of Table 3) disappears
due to the introduction of stock market capitalization (Part B of Table 3) and intermediated credit
(Part C of Table 3)10.
Taken together, these ndings corroborate the idea that nance signicantly aects the relation-
ship between labour market institutions and unemployment. In some countries, nancial factors
mitigate the favourable impact of increased labour market exibility or even make it harmful to
employment. In some others, they make labour market exibilization benecial to employment or
curbs its unfavourable eect. This diversity among countries may explain why aggregate estima-
tions by Gatti & al. (2011) do not provide any clear-cut support to the theoretical argument that
nance aects the relationship between labour market variables and unemployment.
8It is also true that reduced wage coordination becomes harmful to employment when introducing intermediated
credit in the estimation (Part C of Table 3). But this eect appears less signicant than the benecial eect of
introducing banking concentration.
9The paper by Koskela & Stenbacka (2004) provides an interesting example of the emphasis put on interactions
between labour market institutions and banking concentration in Scandinavian countries.
10The detrimental eect of reduced wage coordination in the case of Ireland is in line with Baker et al. (2004)


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In this section, we propose two extensions to our analysis. Inspired by the literature on labour
market institutions (Nickell, Nunziata & Ochel (2005), Nickell (1997), Baccaro & Rei (2007) and
Amable & al. (2011)), we consider the tax wedge (WEDGE) as well as the gross replacement
rate on unemployment (REPLACE) as alternative labour market indicators. We thus estimate
two bivariate panel VAR models, including the tax wedge or the gross replacement rate and the
unemployment rate. We then estimate six trivariate panel VAR models, each containing the tax
wedge or the gross replacement, one nancial variable (market capitalization, intermediated credit
or banking concentration) and the unemployment rate.
Granger-causality tests from the tax wedge to unemployment and from the replacement rate
to unemployment are reported in Tables 4 and 5 respectively. As in Tables 1 to 3, Part A presents
the results for the bivariate VAR model estimations while Part B, Part C and Part D provide
the results for the trivariate VAR model estimations with stock market capitalization (CAPI),
intermediated credit (CREDIT) and banking concentration (CONC) respectively.
Results reported in Tables 4 and 5 indicate that in most countries of our data set, there exists
no Granger-causality from tax wedge and from the replacement rate to unemployment. This
observation is consistent with Amable & al. (2011), and Gatti & al. (2011)). This is the case
in the bivariate model (Part A of Tables 4 and 5). But - and this sharply contrasts with the
ndings obtained in Section 3 -, this also holds when nancial factors are taking into account in
the estimation (Parts B to D of Tables 4 and 5).
However, three exceptions can be pointed out. First, Table 4 reveals that, in Ireland, the
favourable eect of decreased tax wedge on unemployment (Part A) disappears when accounting
for stock market capitalization (Part B), intermediated credit (Part C) or banking concentration
(Part D). Hence, in this case, nancial factors mitigate the positive eects of stronger labour
market exibility. Second, in Germany, reduced tax wedge has no eect on unemployment in the
bivariate model (Part A of Table 4) while it contributes to raise unemployment (Part D of Table
4) when accounting for banking concentration. Finance thus makes labour market exibilization
unfavourable to employment. Finally, in Italy, while there exists no causality from the replacement
rate to unemployment in the bivariate model (Part A of Table 5), a lower replacement rate enhances
employment when stock market capitalization is introduced in the estimation (Part B of Table
5). Hence, in this country, nancial factors make stronger labour market exibility benecial for
employment.
Finally, although they exhibit some interesting results, the estimations presented in this section



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The aim of this empirical contribution was to explore whether nancial factors (stock market cap-
italization, intermediated credit and banking concentration) inuence the eect of labour market
institutions (labour market regulation, union density, degree of wage bargaining, tax wedge and
replacement rate) on unemployment. Using a data set of 18 OECD countries over the period 1980-
2004, we estimated a panel VAR model. We tested for Granger-causalities from labour market
variables to unemployment following the panel-data approach of K onya (2006), which is based on
SUR systems and Wald tests with country specic bootstrap critical values. This allowed us to
check, for each country of our sample, in what extent causalities from labour market arrangements
to unemployment are aected by nancial variables.
Our investigation provides interesting evidence that nance inuences the relationship between
labour market arrangements and unemployment in a complex way. It also highlights the great
diversity of situations among countries. It is shown that in Australia, Belgium, Finland, Italy,
Japan and Spain, accounting for nancial arrangements mitigates the favourable impact of labour
market exibilization or even makes it harmful to employment. In Austria, Canada, Sweden and
Portugal, it reduces its harmful impact on employment or makes its benecial. In Ireland and
Netherlands, both eects take place, depending on the labour market indicator used. When one
considers labour market protection (in Ireland) or union density (in Netherlands), the former
eect prevails. Conversely, in both countries, when one considers the degree of coordination in
wage bargaining, the latter eect is at play. Another nding is that, in most countries of the data
set, there exists no signicant causality from replacement rate or tax wedge to unemployment, even
when nancial variables are introduced in the estimation. However, Ireland, where reduced tax
wedge is shown to mitigate the benets of stronger labour market exibility, oers an interesting
exception to this observation. Taken with our other results, it suggests that Irish employment is
particularly sensitive to interactions between labour market institutions and nancial factors.
Our paper globally advocates care in analysing the eectiveness of nancial policies. Above
their direct eect on employment, already documented in earlier literature, they also aect em-
ployment performance indirectly, through their interactions with labour market institutions.
In conclusion, our investigation opens up a rich research agenda. It is worth noting that
theoretical papers on interactions between labour market and nancial arrangements mainly refer
to the view that labour market deregulation promotes employment. However, in line with a few
earlier papers, our empirical results show that it can also have detrimental eects. The issue
of interactions between nancial and labour market devices thus appears particularly complex:
nance does not only aect the intensity of the relationship between labour market arrangements
and unemployment but may also modify its sign. This empirical observation undoubtedly deserves
to be theoretically formalised and investigated more deeply.
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19Appendix
Table A.1: List of variables
U Standardized rate of unemployment (OECD)
LMREG (0-3) Labour market regulation indicator, Amable et al. (2011) from Nickell et al. (2005) and the FRDB
database
UNION Number of union members as percent of total workers, OECD
COORD (0-3) Index of coordination in wage bargaining, Nickell & al. (2005)
WEDGE Tax wedge, OECD
REPLACE Net replacement rate on unemployment benet, OECD
CAPI Stock market capitalization to GDP, Demirc u c-Kunt & Levine (2001)
CREDIT Claims to the private sector by nancial intermediaries to GDP, Demirc u c-Kunt & Levine (2001)
CONC Three largest banks' asset to total banking sector assets, Demirc u c-Kunt & Levine (2001)
Table A.2: Statistical summary for variables (1980-2004)
Variables Mean Standard deviation Max Min
U 7.447 3.504 19.5 1.5
LMREG 1.140 0.558 0.558 0.1
UNION 41.996 21.068 87.4 7.4
COORD 2.051 0.578 3 1
WEDGE 28.693 8.081 46.962 12.944
REPLACE 0.356 1.312 28 0
CAPI 0.492 0.404 2.7 0.003
CREDIT 0.878 0.378 2.168 0.220
CONC 0.678 0.203 1 0.226
Nonmissing obs.
441
410
378
403
430
430
432
450
450
20